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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael Anthony Sanchez appeals from the district court's Judgment summarily
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The district court dismissed Mr. Sanchez's
petition, finding his petition was only timely from the denial of his successive I.C.R. 35 motion.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.13-19.) However, the Petition was timely from a separate order revoking probation,
which was not noticed as a basis for dismissal by the State or the district court.

Further,

Mr. Sanchez's claims regarding the disposition hearing were never addressed by the State or the
district court. The district court erred in summarily dismissing the Petition because the notice of
the basis for dismissal concerned only the I.C.R. 35 denial, and the Petition was timely from the
order revoking probation.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Michael Anthony Sanchez pied guilty to two counts of robbery, one count of burglary,
and one count of grand theft in Kootenai County case number CRF-2013-23775. (R., pp.31, 36.)
He was sentenced on June 11, 2014, to an aggregate sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years
fixed, with the district court retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp.31, 36.) After a period of retained
jurisdiction, the district court placed Mr. Sanchez on probation. (R., p.36.) After Mr. Sanchez
admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions ofhis probation, the district court revoked
probation. (R., pp.36-37.) Mr. Sanchez filed an I.C.R. 35 motion seeking leniency, but the
district court denied the motion. (R., p.37.) Mr. Sanchez appealed from the order revoking
probation, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. (State v. Sanchez, No.
45058, Unpublished Opinion No. 642 (Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2017); R., pp.36-37.) A remittitur was
issued on December 5, 2017. (R., p.29.)
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On December 5, 2018, Mr. Sanchez filed a Petition seeking Post Conviction Relief
(R., pp.5-20.) In his Petition, Mr. Sanchez asserted that he should be granted post-conviction
relief because his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to file an appeal as requested, failing to
file a motion to disqualify the judge, inducing Mr. Sanchez to plead guilty, and by failing to file
a motion to change the venue. (R., pp.7-20.) Mr. Sanchez asserted that he wrote multiple letters
to his trial counsel, asking him to introduce mitigating evidence at his sentencing/disposition
hearing; however, trial counsel did not tell the court this mitigating information and instead
remained silent. (R., pp.15-16.) The mitigating evidence was that: (1) he was a first-time father
and this would have a positive effect on his future behavior; (2) prison programming was
insufficient, because he needed a much more structured drug and alcoho 1 pro gram such as the
Port of Hope; (3) he was a productive citizen in the community as he was paying taxes and was
employed; (4) he had community support-persons who were ready to verbalize their support.
(R., pp .15-16.)
The district court appointed counsel to assist Mr. Sanchez. (R., p.2.) The State filed its
Answer on December 24, 2018.

(R., pp.21-24.)

The State filed a motion for summary

disposition and supporting affidavit, in which it asserted that the Petition was only timely from
the remittitur of the appeal of the denial of client's second I.C.R. 35 motion on May 22, 2017.
(R., pp.25-43.) The motion sought summary dismissal because the Petition was untimely from
the entry of the underlying sentence on June 12, 2014. (R., p.40.) The State referenced the
remittitur it attached to the affidavit, but concluded "[t]his remittitur, though, applies solely to
the appeal of this Court's denial of Petitioner's second I.C.R. 35 motion on May 22, 2017."
(R., pp.40-41.) The State's affidavit in support of its motion for summary disposition attached
the Idaho Court of Appeals' unpublished decision affirming the decision revoking Mr. Sanchez's
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probation and the remittitur. (R., pp.25-37.) The State also asserted that Mr. Sanchez failed to
show prejudice where "he has not, and cannot, demonstrate the likelihood of success as to any
I.C.R. 35 motion." (R., p.42.) Appointed counsel did not respond to the State's motion for
summary disposition.

(R., p.3.)

After the State filed a reply in support of its motion for

summary disposition, the district court held a summary dismissal hearing. (R., pp.44-48.)
At the hearing, the State asserted that the only claim the post-conviction was timely from
was the denial of the second Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.5, Ls.8-13.) Mr. Sanchez's attorney agreed
that this post-conviction was timely from the successive Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.6, L.21 - p.8,
L.3.) The district court granted the motion for summary dismissal, ruling:
Right now the only thing that is even potentially still alive is the denial of the
successive Rule 35, and the only evidence that I have is the Declaration of
Michael A. Sanchez in Support of Post-Conviction Relief, Page 2, Paragraph, I
guess, 13 is applicable. "My trial counsel did refuse to do as I requested him to
do on multiple occasions," so it's not really specific, but I suppose that ifl view it
in context with Paragraph ... 14, "Trial counsel did willfully mess up my Rule 35
two times. I believe it was intentional. I also believe that he refused to do as I
requested because he was prejudiced against me."
That doesn't get to the point that Ms. Payne argued that Mr. Sanchez allegedly
didn't - didn't want Mr. Pierce, his attorney at the time, to file a Rule 35 at the
time of sentencing when he was sent on his retained. I don't have any evidence of
that. There's nothing in the petition. There's nothing in the declaration. And I I do find that even if there was, the Strickland standard has in no way been met;
neither an allegation, let alone any sort of proof that the attorney's performance
fell below an objective standard, and a demonstration of actual prejudice, so that's
the only thing that's even possibly alive, and I think it's appropriate for summary
dismissal, and the other issues are all untimely.
(Tr., p.8, L.13 - p.9, L.15.) The district court entered a final Judgment on March 5, 2019.
(R., pp.51-52.)

Mr. Sanchez filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Judgment
summarily dismissing his Petition. (R., pp.53-56.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Sanchez's Post-Conviction Petition?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Sanchez's Post-Conviction Petition Where His
Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Present Certain Mitigating Evidence
At The Disposition/Sentencing Hearing Was Timely Filed From The Order Revoking Probation
Mr. Sanchez established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertion that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating information at the disposition/ sentencing
hearing, before the district court revoked Mr. Sanchez's probation. In support of his claims,
Mr. Sanchez submitted evidence in the form of a sworn affidavit.
submitted which controverted Mr. Sanchez's claims.

There was no evidence

Both the State and the district court

addressed an entirely different basis for dismissal-the successive Rule 35 motion-and
Mr. Sanchez's Petition was dismissed solely on those grounds. As such, the basis for dismissal
failed to address the claims timely from the order revoking probation and Mr. Sanchez certainly
should have been allotted an evidentiary hearing on these claims.

A.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence
In an appeal from post-conviction proceedings, the appellate court will exercise free

review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. State, 122
Idaho 426, 434 (Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). The review of "a district court's construction
and application of a statute, the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA), is a matter of
free review." Evensioski v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 190 (2001) (citations omitted).
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying
criminal action which led to the petitioner's conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456
(1991).

It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act

(hereinafter, UPCPA) (LC. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456.

Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner must prove his
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allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903

(2007). However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceeding differs from the complaint
initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition must include more than "a short and plain
statement of the claim"; it "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge
of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not attached." Id.;
I.C. § 19-4903.
The limitation period for filing a post-conviction petition begins to run, after an
unsuccessful appeal, when the reviewing court issues a remittitur. Freeman v. State, 122 Idaho
627, 629 (Ct. App. 1992). "Because the district court was not required to take any action
pertaining to the judgment of conviction, it was final when the remittitur was issued."
Cochran v. State, 133 Idaho 205, 207 (Ct. App. 1999).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through postconviction proceedings. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show that trial counsel's
performance was constitutionally deficient-that the attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). After a defendant shows that his counsel was

deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, at
694; Aragon, at 760.
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as to any
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material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LC. § 19-4906(c). In
analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district court need not "accept either
the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant's conclusions of law." Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995).
Additionally, the district court need not accept those of the petitioner's allegations which are
"clearly disproved by the record."

Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996).

However, if the petitioner presents some shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the
district court must take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least until such time as they are
controverted by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968) (holding that the State's
motion to dismiss was unsupported by any affidavits or depositions, and therefore did not
"controvert" the facts alleged in the petitioner's application). This is so even if the allegations
appear incredible on their face. Id.

The district court is required to accept the petitioner's

unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the petitioner's conclusion.
Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903. Thus, only after the State controverts the petitioner's allegations

can the district court consider the evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982).
In doing so, it must still liberally construe the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of
the petitioner. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327,331 (Ct. App. 1998).
If a question of material fact is presented, the district court must conduct an evidentiary

hearing to resolve that question. Id. If there is no question of fact, and if the State is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, dismissal can be ordered sua sponte, or pursuant to the State's
motion. LC. § 19-4906(b), (c).
Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the finding of
contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations of law.
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Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court's summary dismissal order de novo.
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).

B.

The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Sanchez's Post-Conviction Petition Where
The Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Present Certain Mitigating
Evidence At The Disposition/Sentencing Hearing Was Timely Filed From The Order
Revoking Probation
Here, one post-conviction issue was whether Mr. Sanchez's trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to present mitigating evidence at his probation disposition/sentencing hearing that
Mr. Sanchez: (1) was a first-time father and this would have a positive effect on his future
behavior; (2) would not benefit from prison programming, because he needed a much more
structured drug and alcohol program such as the Port of Hope; (3) was a productive citizen in the
community as he was paying taxes and was employed; (4) had community support-persons
who were ready to verbalize their support.

(R., pp.15-16.)

The deficient performance by

Mr. Sanchez's attorney at his probation disposition/sentencing hearing was asserted as a postconviction claim; however, the issue was never addressed by the district court in its decision to
grant the State's motion for summary dismissal.

(See Tr., p.8, L.13 - p.9, L.21.)

At the

February 26, 2019 hearing on the State's motion for summary dismissal, both parties and the
district court discussed only the successive Rule 35 motion. (See generally Tr.) The district
court decided only the successive Rule 35 claims made in the Petition, finding that the only issue
"still alive" was the denial of the second Rule 35 motion and concluding that Mr. Sanchez's
claims were not specific other than to say, "My trial counsel did refuse to do as I requested him
to do on multiple occasions." (Tr., p.8, Ls.19-21.) The district court considered the statement in
conjunction with Mr. Sanchez's later statement, "Trial counsel did willfully mess up my Rule 35

8

two times. I believe it was intentional. I also believe that he refused to do as I requested because
he was prejudiced against me." (Tr., p.8, L.21 -p.9, L.1.) The court concluded:
That doesn't get to the point that Ms. Payne argued that Mr. Sanchez allegedly
didn't - didn't want Mr. Pierce, his attorney at the time, to file a Rule 35 at the
time of sentencing when he was sent on his retained. I don't have any evidence of
that. There's nothing in the petition. There's nothing in the declaration. And I I do find that even if there was, the Strickland standard has in no way been met;
neither an allegation, let alone any sort of proof that the attorney's performance
fell below an objective standard, and a demonstration of actual prejudice, so that's
the only thing that's even possibly alive, and I think it's appropriate for summary
dismissal, and the other issues are all untimely.
(Tr., p.8, L.13 -p.9, L.15.)

The district court dismissed the petition because it did not find that

Mr. Sanchez supported his allegation that his counsel's performance was deficient for filing a
Rule 35 from Mr. Sanchez's sentencing hearing, and that Mr. Sanchez did not show prejudice
even if the performance in filing a premature Rule 35 was deficient. (Tr., p.8, L.16 - p.9, L.15.)
The court found that all other issues were untimely. (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-16; p.9, Ls.9-15.)
The district court correctly found that the Petition was untimely from the original
judgment of conviction and the guilty plea (Tr., p.9, Ls.16-19); however, the district court failed
to recognize that the post-conviction action was timely filed from the remittitur issued after
Mr. Sanchez's appeal from the order revoking probation (R., p.19). The district court erred by
dismissing the Petition in its entirety, as Mr. Sanchez's Petition, filed on December 5, 2018, was
timely filed from the remittitur issued on December 5, 2017. (R., pp.5, 19.)
Mr. Sanchez's Petition was timely filed where he timely appealed the revocation of his
probation, a remittitur in the appeal was issued on December 5, 2017, and Mr. Sanchez filed his
post-conviction petition one year later. Thus, the district court erred where it concluded that only
the successive Rule 35 motion was at issue, and by dismissing the Petition in its entirety, on that
basis.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his post-conviction action and remand this case to the district court for an
evidentiary hearing on all of the timely claims made in his petition for post-conviction relief
DATED this 22 nd day of October, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22 nd day of October, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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